Infinitism - Philosophical Concept | Alexandria
Infinitism, in epistemology, is the theory that justification for a belief can be infinite. Rather than requiring a belief to be grounded in a foundational, self-justifying certainty or caught in a circular chain of reasoning, infinitism proposes that justification extends endlessly backward, each reason supported by a further reason in an infinite regress. This concept, often misunderstood as advocating for an endless, and hence impractical, pursuit of justification, challenges our intuitive notions about how and when we can truly "know" something.
While the formal articulation of infinitism is relatively recent, seeds of the idea can perhaps be traced to skeptical arguments found in ancient Greek philosophy. Sextus Empiricus, in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (circa 2nd century CE), explored the infinite regress argument as a challenge to dogmatic assertions of knowledge. Though Sextus wasn't explicitly advocating infinitism, his skeptical methods helped lay groundwork by questioning finite foundations for knowledge. The era was rife with intellectual battles, between dogmatists asserting absolute truths and skeptics challenging every claim; a context from which the problem of infinite regress emerged as a significant point of contention.
The evolution of infinitism as a distinct epistemological position gained momentum in the late 20th century. Philosophers like Peter Klein explicitly defended infinitism as a viable alternative to foundationalism and coherentism. Klein argued that an infinite regress of reasons, although seemingly impossible to traverse in practice, is not inherently vicious. He proposed that what matters is the availability of further justifying reasons, not our ability to actually articulate them all. Infinitism faced criticism, primarily concerning its apparent impracticality. How can anyone ever truly be justified if justification requires an infinite chain of reasons? Defenders respond by distinguishing between having a justification and being able to exhaustively express it. The debate continues, with intriguing connections drawn to contemporary discussions of computationalism and whether minds can process, even implicitly, potentially infinite information.
Infinitism's lasting impact lies in its radical questioning of traditional epistemological assumptions. It pushes us to reconsider what “justification” truly means and whether our pursuit of knowledge must always be grounded in finite certainties. Even if infinitism isn't ultimately accepted as the correct theory of justification, its challenge forces us to justify our own views about justification. Does our insistence on foundations merely reflect a psychological need for security, or is it genuinely essential for knowledge? The question lingers, inviting further exploration of this intriguing, and often misunderstood, epistemological stance.