Is/Ought Problem - Philosophical Concept | Alexandria
The Is/Ought Problem, also known as Hume's Law, confronts us with a seemingly simple yet profoundly unsettling question: can we derive statements about what ought to be from statements about what is? This deceptively straightforward query, often misconstrued as a mere semantic debate, lies at the heart of ethics, morality, and even our understanding of human nature.
The earliest explicit articulation of this problem can be traced to David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740). In Book III, Section I, he observes that moral philosophers often transition seamlessly from descriptive statements ("is") to prescriptive conclusions ("ought") without explaining how the latter logically follows from the former. Hume's era was rife with debates about natural law and divine command theory, where morality was frequently grounded in observations of nature or interpretations of scripture. His challenge cast a shadow of doubt, suggesting that these foundations might be built on shifting sands.
Over the centuries, responses to Hume's challenge have shaped ethical theory. Some, like G.E. Moore with his concept of the "naturalistic fallacy," argued that "good" is indefinable in natural terms, further solidifying the gap between fact and value. Others have attempted to bridge this divide. Natural law theorists sought a telos, or inherent purpose, in nature, while emotivists posited that moral statements are merely expressions of feeling. Intriguingly, the problem echoes in contemporary debates about artificial intelligence – can we program a machine to be ethical simply by giving it information about human behavior?
The Is/Ought Problem continues to haunt philosophical discussions and influence our understanding of everything from policy-making to personal ethics. It prompts us to critically examine the seemingly self-evident leaps we make from observing the world to judging it. With every advancement in science and technology, the question of how "is" relates to "ought" becomes ever more pressing. Does an understanding of evolution justify social Darwinism? Does the existence of inequality necessitate a specific political response? The enduring mystique of the Is/Ought Problem lies in its ability to expose the often-unacknowledged assumptions that underpin our moral convictions, leaving us to ponder: where does our sense of what should be truly come from?