Textualism - Philosophical Concept | Alexandria
Textualism, in the realm of Constitutional Law, is a seemingly straightforward method of statutory and constitutional interpretation that prioritizes the ordinary meaning of the text itself. It posits that the words on a page, not legislative intent or evolving societal norms, are the primary, perhaps sole, source of legal authority. But is it truly that simple? The name itself implies a rigid adherence to the written word, yet textualism’s application and consequences are often debated. What lies beneath the surface of this interpretative philosophy?
While not explicitly termed "Textualism" until the late 20th century, its roots can be traced back to earlier legal philosophies emphasizing legal formalism and the importance of objective interpretation. Hints of this approach appear in late 19th and early 20th-century legal writings, particularly in discussions surrounding statutory construction. The rise of legal realism, which challenged the idea of objective interpretation, indirectly spurred the development of textualism as a counter-movement. Thinkers began to question whether judicial subjectivity could be truly banished, even with supposed clear textual constraints.
The formal articulation and rise to prominence of Textualism is largely attributed to Justice Antonin Scalia's writings and jurisprudence beginning in the 1980s. His advocacy championed the idea that judges should focus exclusively on the public meaning of the words at the time of enactment. Over time, textualism has been refined, debated, and applied in various legal contexts, profoundly impacting judicial opinions and legal scholarship. This approach has influenced debates on the role of judges, the interpretation of constitutional rights, and the balance of power between the branches of government. But does this method truly provide objective answers, or does it mask underlying subjective choices about which "ordinary meaning" to prioritize?
Textualism’s legacy continues to shape legal discussions and remains a potent force within legal theory and practice. Its emphasis on the written word resonates in an age grappling with questions of authenticity and authority. Whether viewed as a bulwark against judicial activism or a rigid constraint on legal evolution, Textualism invites us to consider: What does it truly mean to interpret the words of the law, and can we ever fully escape the influence of our own perspectives?