That Nothing is Known - Classic Text | Alexandria

That Nothing is Known - Classic Text | Alexandria
That Nothing is Known (Quod Nihil Scitur) That Nothing is Known, originally published in 1581 as "Quod Nihil Scitur," stands as one of the most provocative philosophical treatises of the Renaissance period, authored by the Portuguese philosopher and medical doctor Francisco Sanches (1550-1623). This radical skeptical work, written in Latin, presents a systematic critique of Aristotelian scholasticism and challenges the very possibility of human knowledge, emerging at a crucial moment when medieval certainties were giving way to Renaissance questioning. The treatise first appeared in Lyon, France, during a period of intense intellectual ferment marked by religious wars, scientific discoveries, and the recovery of classical texts. Sanches, writing from his position as both a practicing physician and a philosophical thinker, brought a unique empirical perspective to epistemological questions that would later influence the development of modern scientific methodology. His work predated Descartes' famous methodological doubt by several decades, though remained relatively obscure until its rediscovery in the 19th century. The text's central argument develops through a series of carefully constructed skeptical arguments that challenge traditional notions of knowledge and certainty. Sanches introduces a revolutionary approach that combines medical observation with philosophical reasoning, arguing that true knowledge is impossible due to the limitations of human perception and the complexity of nature. His method, which he termed "scientific skepticism," anticipated many concerns of modern empiricism while maintaining a distinctly Renaissance sensibility about the limits of human understanding. The influence of That Nothing is Known continues to resonate in contemporary discussions about the nature of knowledge, scientific methodology, and the limits of human understanding. Modern scholars have recognized Sanches as a crucial bridge figure between medieval scholasticism and modern scientific thinking, while his work has gained renewed attention in debates about post-truth society and the foundations of knowledge. The text's central question - whether genuine knowledge is possible - remains as pertinent today as it was in the 16th century, inviting readers to consider their own assumptions about what it means to know something with certainty.
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